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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER NAFTA: IS
CHILE UP TO THE CHALLENGE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Even before the original North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
between the United States, Canada, and Mexico took effect,' speculation
flourished as to which country would be the next admitted into NAFTA. From
the beginning, Chile was the front- runner.
On June 27, 1990, President Bush launched a new economic initiative with
Latin America, known as the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), to
expand trade among the nations of the Western Hemisphere, foster trade and
investment in Latin American nations, and provide debt relief for these nations.2
In December 1990, during a visit to South America, President Bush described
his goal of a hemispheric free-trade union "[f]rom the northernmost reaches of
Canada... to the tip of Cape Horn." 3 Bush had clearly identified Chile as a
potential candidate for a free-trade agreement with the United States, as Chile
was becoming one of Latin America's most market-oriented economies.4 In
November 1991, Chile was promised that negotiations for a U.S.-Chile free trade
agreement could begin as early as February 1992.'
But by 1992, NAFTA negotiations were well underway between the United
States, Canada, and Mexico, and Chile was informed that it would have to wait
until after the conclusion of the NAFTA negotiations to discuss a free trade
1. While a consensus was reached by these countries on August 12, 1992, the agreement did not take
effect until January 1, 1994. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, ch. 17, 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA].
2. UNrrED STATES INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC Pub. 2521, U.S. MARKEr ACCESS IN LATIN AMERICA:
RECENT LIBERALIZATION MEASURES AND REMAINING BARRIERS (Report to the Committee on Finance of the
United States Senate on Investigation No. 332-318 Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930) at v (1992),
[hereinafter USITC].
3. Latin America: Bush Hails Possibility of Hemispheric Free Trade Zone During South America Trip,
7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 1825 (Dec. 5, 1990).
4. Chile and U.S. Sign Accord Seen Leading to Free-Trade Pact, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1990, at B6.
5. George Holding Taylor, The Americas: Chile Can Win on Fast Track, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1991,
at A15.
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agreement. Unhappy with this development, Chile hinted it would look for other
trading partners, such as Japan.6
When President Clinton took office in 1993, his administration agreed that
Chile was the Latin American country best prepared to enter into a free trade
agreement with the United States.7 He reassured Chile that free trade negotia-
tions would begin as soon as the NAFTA negotiations were completed.8 To
help solidify the United States' interest in Chile, the Chilean Chamber of
Commerce and the Production and Trade Confederation employed lobbyists in
Washington.9 Their goal was to push for a bilateral trade pact independent of
NAFTA.)0
By early 1994 Chile had publicly indicated its desire to join NAFTA instead
of limiting itself to a free trade agreement with the United States." Chile also
indicated it was willing to commit to side agreements concerning environmental
issues to help speed up the negotiation process.' However, in April 1994, the
Clinton Administration responded with mixed signals to the idea of Chile's
accession to NAFTA. The Undersecretary of Commerce for International
Affairs, Jeffery Garten, stated that it might take "a lot longer" for Chile to join
NAFTA than to negotiate a free trade agreement with the United States alone.
13
Mr. Garten told reporters that while the Administration still supported the overall
goal of free trade with Chile, it was "less clear just how to go about" accom-
plishing this goal. 4
Shortly thereafter, the Clinton Administration began a campaign to "play
down" the expectations of Latin American countries with regard to NAFTA
accession." The Administration indicated that it was not abandoning the goal
6. Bob Davis, One America: The North American Free-Trade Agreement Pact May Be Just the First Step
Toward a Hemispheric Bloc, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1992, at R1. During a June 1992, visit to the United
States, Chilean Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley Rioseco reminded the Bush administration that Japan was
Chile's top export market. Id.
7. The Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, Jeffery E. Garten stated that Chile is an
"excellent candidate" to accede to NAFTA or enter into a free trade agreement with the United States, but
cautioned that accession to NAFTA is the most difficult option for Chile. Trade Policy: NAFTA Expansion
and Subregional Pacts Not Mutually Exclusive, Garten Says, 7 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 582 (Apr.
13, 1994).
8. Chile: Private Sector Plans Lobbying Blitz in Washington to Push For Chile-U.S. Free Trade Accord,
CHRON. LATIN AM. ECON. AFF., April 29, 1993, available in WESTLAW, CRLAMECAF Database.
9. Id. I
10. Id. The president of the Production and Trade Confederation stated, "[t]he goal of our trip is to build
an intense lobby in favor of a free trade accord and convince the Clinton administration and U.S. legislators
to place negotiations with Chile on a fast track." Id.
11. NAFTA: Ambassador Indicates Chile Ready to Accept NAFTA Environmental Side Deal, INT'L. TRADE
DAILY (BNA), Jan. 26, 1994, available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database. Heraldo Munoz, Chile's
Ambassador to the Organization of American States, was quoted as saying "Chile is absolutely ready to enter
NAFTA." Id.
12. Id.
13. Clinton Aide Says Latin Nations May Forgo NAFTA for Bilateral Pacts, J. CoM., Apr. 8, 1994, at 2A.
14. Id.
15. Stephen Fidler, U.S. Plays Down Latin American NAFTA Hopes: Washington Cautious, FIN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 12, 1994, at 4.
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of hemispheric free trade, just prioritizing the agenda for the second half of
1994.16
In June 1994, the Administration again promised that a free trade agreement
with Chile was coming, but Chile would now have to wait until the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAMF) bill passed. 7
In early July 1994, the Administration reported to Congress that Chile was
the only candidate currently prepared to begin negotiating a free trade agreement
with the United States. 18 However, the report also commented that before
proceeding with a free trade agreement, or accession to NAFTA, the Administra-
tion might seek investment and intellectual property rights agreements with the
candidate country. 9
At the same time, the Institute for International Economics (Institute)
released a report which also concluded that Chile was the best suited Latin
American country to enter into a free trade agreement with the United States.2"
The Institute used a mathematical formula for determining a country's readiness
to accede to NAFTA. The criteria included: price stability, budget discipline,
external debt position, currency stability, market-oriented policies, reduced
reliance on trade taxes, and a functioning democracy.2' The report concluded
that Chile currently scores better than Mexico did just before it entered into
NAFTA.22 The Institute strongly urged the United States to proceed via
accession to NAFTA 3
16. Id. The mid-term congressional elections were upcoming in November.
17. NAFTA: Brown Sees NAFTA Expansion Only After Approval of GATT Bill, INT'L TRADE DAILY
(BNA), June 21, 1994, available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database. On June 20, 1994, U.S. Commerce
Secretary Ronald Brown stated "[o]bviously there is some controversy about (GATT), and it seems to me that
we would want to complete that process before we moved on to specific negotiations, be they bilateral free
trade negotiations or negotiations on the subject of accession to NAFrA." Id.
18. Richard Lawrence, Chile, Barbados, Trinidad Seen as Likeliest NAFTA Candidates, J. COM., July 7,
1994, at 2A. Section 108 of the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act requires that the
President, based on a report from the U.S. Trade Representative identify those candidates that are eligible to
begin free-trade negotiations with the United States by July 1, 1994.
19. Lawrence, supra note 18. Ron Brown, U.S. Commerce Secretary, stated: "Our emphasis will be on
'building blocks' of various types, in advance of free trade agreements ... [t]hese can include intellectual
property agreements, bilateral investment treaties, understanding on disciplines that we recognize are broadly
supported by the private sector. The NAFTA's disciplines will serve as a model in many respects." Nancy
Dunne, Trinidad and Chile 'Top List for U.S. Links', FIN. TIMES (London), July 7, 1994, World Trade News,
at 7.
20. Dunne, supra note 19. The report is entitled Western Hemispheric Economic Integration. Trade
Policy: lIE Recommends NAFTA Accession in Pursuing Western Hemisphere, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
11, at 1102 (July 13, 1994) [hereinafter Trade Policy].
21. Trade Policy, supra note 20.
22. Durne, supra note 19. Chile was placed at 4.4 on a scale of 5, while Mexico was only at 3.9 before
entering NAFTA. Id
23. Id. The report stated: "[p]olitically, stand alone talks would divide the hemisphere because existing
NAFFA members would feel they were being played off against potential new U.S. partners. Economically,
individual countries would be shortchanged in their trading relations with one another if the United States
enters into separate arrangements with each." Trade Policy, supra note 20.
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President Clinton was unsuccessful in obtaining fast-track negotiating
authority for trade negotiations with Chile in August of 1994.' Several
Congressmen staunchly opposed linking labor and environmental issues with
trade agreements.' On September 13, 1994, when the Clinton administration
officially announced it was withdrawing its plan to seek fast-track negotiating
authority from Congress,2 6 it looked as though a U.S.-Chile free trade agree-
ment would be delayed until at least the beginning of 1995. But U.S. Trade
representative Mickey Kantor reassured Chilean government officials once again
that the United States remained "firmly committed" to negotiating a free trade
deal with Chile.27
Frustrated, Chile announced its intention to begin independent trade
negotiations with Mexico and Canada in November of 1994.' Chilean Finance
Minister Eduardo Aninat stated that "[tihe long run goal has to be an integration.
throughout the Americas, from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. The route to that end
isn't crucial to us."2
9
While the United States has remained undecided about how to proceed,
Canada has urged the NAFTA agreement be open to any country. Canadian
Trade Minister Roy MacLaren believes the concept of admitting other countries
is easy, stating the pivotal question as: "Can you accept the terms of NAFrA,
yes, or no?"3 Mexico has also conceded to allowing other countries to enter
NAFTA, but they would prefer waiting a couple of years.31
From December 9-11, 1994, the United States hosted the Summit of the
Americas (Summit) in Miami. The meeting united the thirty-four democratically
elected leaders of the Western Hemisphere.32 The main focus of the Summit
was trade. At the conclusion of the Summit, the United States, Canada, and
24. See Peter Behr, Senate Panel Backs New Global Trading Rules; Finance Committee Rejects
President's Request for Environmental, Worker Protection Powers, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1994, at F3. When
Congress grants "fast-track" authority to the President, it grants the authority to negotiate an international
trade agreement, which Congress must approve. Under "fast-track" authority Congress agrees either to accept
or reject the treaty, but may not make amendments. NAFTA was passed under "fast-track" authority. Helene
Cooper, Clinton is Dealt Major Setback in Trade Power, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1994, at A2.
25. Behr, supra note 24. Rep. Richard Gephardt's (D - Mo.) fast-track bill, endorsed by the Clinton
administration, incorporated provisions on workers' rights and environmental protection into the agreement
rather than negotiating side agreements, the process followed with Mexico. Charles W. Thurston, Next on
Agenda: Hemispheric Free Trade, J. CoM., June 29, 1994, at IC.
26. Chile: U.S. Reassures Chile of Commitment to Free Trade Deal, U.S. Officials Say, INT'L TRADE
DAILY (BNA), Sept. 16, 1994, available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database.
27. Id.
28. Matt Moffett, Chile, Eager to be Part of NAFTA, May Aim for Talks Without U.S., WALL ST. J., Nov.
1, 1994, at A17.
29. Id.
30. John Urquhart, Canadian Trade Minister Says NAFTA Should Be Opened Up to Other Nations, WALL
ST. J., May 31, 1994, at C18.
31. Christopher Marquis, Who's next in line for NAFTA?, J. COM., Apr. 11, 1994, at 12A. While Mexico
would prefer to add new member to NAFTA at a slower pace they flatly deny allegations that would block the
expansion of NAFTA. A Mexican official responding to the claim that Mexico disfavored the admission of
other countries into NAFTA stated, "I don't know who came up with the idea of blaming Mexico. We've told
them [the U.S. government] to go look elsewhere for a scapegoat." hL
32. NAFTA: Chile Accession to NAFTA Will Be Lengthy, Brown Says, INT'L TRADE DALY (BNA), Dec.
9, 1994, available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database.
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Mexico formally extended an invitation to Chile to begin negotiations to join
NAFTA.3a Canada's Prime Minister stated "[f]or one year now we've been the
three amigos. Starting today, we will become the four amigos." '
President Clinton has chosen to begin negotiations with Chile for NAFTA
accession without fast-track authority.3 5 After the official announcement, U.S.
Trade Representative Mickey Kantor stated that the Administration will seek
"broad" negotiating authority from Congress in 1995, including authority to
conclude the NAFTA accession.36 However, White House Press Secretary Dee
Dee Myers has stated that even if the Administration does not obtain fast-track
authority, Chile's NAFTA accession could pass through the legislature under the
normal procedure.37  Kantor announced that representatives from the three
NAFTA countries would meet in late December 1994, to contemplate "readiness,
criteria and timetables". 3' He also stated that the trade ministers would meet
no later than May 31, 1995, to discuss "the results of working-level discussions
held during the first five months of the new year. ' 39  "We're going to have to
be careful as we go into the accession. After all, this is going to set a precedent
(for all other countries)."
NAFrA's primary objectives are the break down of trade barriers through
the elimination of tariffs on goods originating in the member counties, fair
competition, and increasing investment opportunities for the signatories."
While a free trade agreement with Chile "represents a small market monetarily,"
it represents "a large step symbolically."'42 While the U.S. depends on the
export market in Latin America and seeks to urge the continuance of market
liberalization,43 for Chile, the stakes are much higher. "[I]f Chile is acceptable
as a partner to the U.S., it will draw the attention of investors. A free trade
agreement can bring in investment from third countries seeking access to the
33. Helene Cooper & Jose de Cordoba, Chile is Invited to Join NAFTA as U.S. Pledges Free-Trade Zone
for Americas, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1994, at A3.
34. Id.
35. NAFTA: Discussions on Chile Link to NAFTA to Precede Bid for Fast-Track Authority, INT'L TRADE
DAILY (BNA), Dec. 13, 1994, available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database.
36. Fast Track: 'Broad' Fast Track Authority Sought to Negotiate With Chile, Other Nations, INT'L TRADE
DAILY (BNA), Dec. 14, 1994, available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database.
37. NAFTA: Discussions on Chile Link to NAFTA to Precede Bid for Fast-Track Authority, supra note
35.
38. NAFTA: NAFTA Countries Plan to Move 'Quickly' in Talks with Chile, USTR Kantor Says , Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA), Dec. 16, 1994, at d13, available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database.
39. Id.
40. Id. Statement by U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor.
41. NAFTA, supra note 1, Art. 102.
42. Bob Davis, White House Plans to Request Authority For Free-Trade Talks; Chile Pact is Seen, WALL
ST. J., May 4, 1994, at A2. Chile is the 35th largest trading partner of the United States. Moffett, supra note
28.
43. Id. In relation to the three NAFTA countries, Chile is most often compared with Mexico although
there is quite a difference in terms of market size. Mexico has a population of 85 million, while Chile's
population is 13.8 million. Michael Doyle, Clinton Offers Chile Full Role in Trade Pact, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Dec. 12, 1994, at Al.
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U.S. market."" However, problems will arise in negotiating any free trade
agreement.
The main problems in negotiating with Chile concern inadequate intellectual
property protection, environmental concerns, and workers' rights.4" This
Comment focuses on the intellectual property issues, specifically, pharmaceutical
patent protection, parallel importing, and the Cultural Industries Exclusion.
II. THE NAFTA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS: CHAPTER
SEVENTEEN
NAFTA is intended to facilitate trade between its signatories.46 However,
free trade cannot exist without respect for the domestic laws of each trading
partner. One aspect of trade in which legal disparity exists worldwide is
intellectual property.47 Chapter Seventeen of NAFMA specifically addresses this
issue and harmonizes the distinctions of the intellectual property law systems by
producing a uniform standard under which member nations can operate.4
Article 1701 of Chapter Seventeen requires that each party shall provide
"adequate and effective enforcement of intellectual property rights" to the
nationals of another party, "while ensuring that measures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade. "
49
NAFTA is not intended to provide the maximum protection of intellectual
property rights. Article 1701 merely establishes the minimum level of
intellectual property rights each party must provide, by specifically referencing
several intellectual property treaties already in force. 50 Under NAFTA, each
44. Comments of Jose Antonio Guzman, President of Chile's Confederation of Production and Commerce.
Thomas Kamm, Free-Market Model: Chile's Economy Roars As Exports Take Off ln Post-Pinochet Era, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 25, 1993, at Al.
45. In early December, 1994, Republican leaders, in a letter to U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor,
"reiterated their strong opposition to tying trade sanctions to labor or environmental objectives, particularly in
fast track legislation." Fast Track: 'Broad' Fast Track Authority Sought to Negotiate With Chile, Other
Nations, supra note 36. Since it is unlikely that environmental or labor issues will be incorporated into
NAFTA, this paper will address only the issue of intellectual property protection.
46. NAFTA, supra note 1.
47. Report of the Industry Functional Advisory Committee for Trade in Intellectual Property Rights on
the North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 1992 at 42 [hereinafter IFAC Report]. "Piracy and other
unauthorized reproduction or public communication of works comprise the U.S. copyright industries' principal
market access barrier around the world." Id.
48. NAF'A, supra note 1, art. 1701, para. 2. "For the purpose of this Chapter... intellectual property
rights refers to copyright and related rights, trademark rights, patent rights, rights in layout designs of
semiconductor integrated circuits, trade secret rights, plant breeders' rights, rights in geographical indications
and industrial design rights." Id.
49. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1701, para. 1.
50. Id. at para. 2. This article expressly references four conventions:
(a) the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized
Duplication of their Phonograms, 1971 (Geneva Convention);
(b) the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1971
(Berne Convention);
(c) the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1967 (Paris Convention); and
(d) the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 1978 (UPOV
Convention), or the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 1991
(UPOV Convention).
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party must provide the level of intellectual property rights protection afforded in
the substantive portions of the enumerated treaties, even if the party has not
agreed to that convention prior to the party's entry into the NAFTA agree-
ment." A party's domestic laws may provide more extensive protection of
intellectual property rights than is required under the Agreement, as long as that
protection is not inconsistent with the text of the agreement.
52
Chile's intellectual property protection is not at the level of the current
NAFTA members. Although a signatory of the Berne and Geneva conventions,
Chile does not provide the level of protection that the United States, Canada, and
Mexico currently provide.53 Significant changes in Chile's intellectual property
laws will be required to fulfill the intent of this chapter. The main area of
concern, as discussed below, is pharmaceutical patent protection.54
A. Patent Protection
The greatest disparity in patent protection between Chile and the present
NAFTA countries is in the area of pharmaceuticals. The issue of pharmaceutical
patents has been a "long-standing source of conflict" between the United States
and Chile.55 Prior to 1991, Chile refused to afford any patent protection to
pharmaceutical products and processes.56 Chilean laboratories freely copied
drugs, while American drug manufacturers suffered significant losses due to the
lack of patent protection.57
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association claims that Chile's
inadequate patent laws cost U.S. pharmaceutical companies $4.7 million per year
between 1970 and 1990, for a total of $94 million. In 1990, this group began
to petition the U.S. Trade Representative for trade sanctions against Chile.59
The group claimed that not only were Chilean drug companies copying drugs,
but they were also exporting the drugs to Central America, further damaging the
U. S. companies.6° Chilean consumer groups countered that drug prices would
substantially increase if monopolistic pharmaceutical patents were recognized.61
In an effort to increase its chances of joining a free trade agreement with
the United States, Chile passed a pharmaceutical patent law in September
Id. at para. 3. Mexico has two years to comply with the substantive provisions of the 1978 or 1991 UPOV
Convention. Id. Annex 1701.3.
51. Id. art. 1701.
52. Id. art. 1702.
53. USITC, supra note 2, at 5-17.
54. See infra notes 55-81 and accompanying text.
55. USITC, supra note 2, at 5-20.
56. Id. Chile and Mexico are the only Latin American countries which provide pharmaceutical patent
protection. See also Chile Completes its Patent Laws Reform, MARKETLE"rER, May 23, 1992 [hereinafter
MARKErl.ErElR 1992].
57. Barbara Durr, Chile Surrenders to U.S. Threat on Pharmaceutical Patents, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb.
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1991.62 This was an important first step, but controversy still exists. Two
major aspects of the Chilean Pharmaceutical Patent Law concern the American
pharmaceutical industry.63 First is the term of patent protection and second is
the "pipeline protection" exception for pharmaceuticals.'
The term of patent protection is of particular concern to the U.S. pharma-
ceutical industry due to the lengthy development period associated with bringing
a new drug to market. The process of regulatory approval and testing normally
takes between eight and ten years.65 Currently, Chile's pharmaceutical patent
protection is only fifteen years from the date a patent is granted.' NAFTA has
set the term of patent protection at the international standard of twenty years
from the date of filing (seventeen years from the date of a patent grant).67 The
United States continues to pressure Chile to further increase its patent protection
from fifteen to twenty years. American pharmaceutical manufacturers are
concerned that more than half of the patent's life is wasted during the drug
development period, and subsequently, the pharmaceutical manufacturers see
little benefit from the fifteen years of patent protection currently being provided.
An additional concern for U.S. pharmaceutical companies is "pipeline
protection." Under the 1991 Chilean patent law, pharmaceutical patents that
were already on file in foreign countries are to be honored as long as they were
filed after September 30, 1991, the date the Chilean patent law was passed.68
U.S. pharmaceutical companies want Chile to recognize all foreign patents
retroactively, providing pipeline protection, for the unexpired term of the patent,
regardless of when the patent was filed. NAFTA currently provides for pipeline
protection of pharmaceutical products for "the unexpired term of the patent."69
Pharmaceutical industry representatives in the United States are concerned that
without the pipeline protection, "the pharmaceutical industry will not benefit
from the net effect of [Chile's] patent law until after this century."70
As the NAFTA countries and Chile begin accession negotiations,
pharmaceutical patents are certain to be major stumbling block. The Chilean drug
industry is disturbed by the patent law already in place. This powerful lobbying
group is sure to resist further expansion of the patent laws, including extending
patent protection to twenty years. At a Latin American Pharmaceutical Industry
meeting, Chilean officials warned Argentina not to change its patent law, citing
the problems Chile encountered as a result of its 1991 changes.7' The United
62. MARKETLETrER 1992, supra note 56. The United States threatened trade sanctions of nearly $100
million, if Chile failed to pass a pharmaceutical patent law. Currently the United States accounts for 22% of
Chile's exports. Durr, supra note 57.




67. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709, para. 12. NAFTA also extends the term of patent protection to
account for delays in the regulatory approval process. lId
68. Durr, supra note 57.
69. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709(4).
70. USITC, supra note 2, at 5-20.
71. Chile and Mexico Warn Argentina on Patents, MARKELETrER, May 23, 1994 [hereinafter
MARKETLErrER 1994].
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States had promised the Chilean pharmaceutical industry increased investment
under a reformed patent system.72 Instead, five of the multinational pharmaceu-
tical companies previously manufacturing in Chile sold their plants and now
export their products to Chile.
On the other side of the table, Canadian and Mexican pharmaceutical
industry representatives are also disturbed by the effects of their pharmaceutical
patent law reforms that were the result of United States pressure.74 Canadian
officials advised Latin American countries to resist a U.S. style patent protection
system.75 The President of the Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association stated
that the new pharmaceutical patent laws passed in Canada have hurt the
Canadian health care system and pharmaceutical industry.76 The President of
the Mexican National Industry Association also stated that the revised Mexican
patent law favors multinational drug companies that operate in Mexico,
particularly those from the United States.77
Obviously, patent laws are essential to the United States. However, the
comments made by Canadian and Mexican officials could prove to complicate
negotiations with Chile. The United States' position on patent protection is
clear; it intends to use NAFTA as a base from which to build. The United States
is beginning a push to extend patent protection from twenty to twenty-three
years.78 However, Canada and Mexico may not be willing to enforce this level
of patent protection. Since Canada and Mexico are both unhappy with the
results of their own patent reform, they may not be willing to force the full
burden of NAFTA patent laws onto a much smaller economy, at least not all at
once. Canada and Mexico may opt for a phase-in period over which a new
entrant such as Chile could gradually increase patent laws to avoid a heightened
economic burden. These issues must be decided by the three NAFTA countries
before the negotiations with Chile begin.
B. The Gray Market & Parallel Importing
NAFTA fails to address the problem of gray market goods.79 Gray market
goods are not counterfeit or pirated, like black market goods, but are authentic
items purchased legally in the country for which they are licensed, during
advantageous currency fluctuations.80 Parallel importing8' occurs when these
goods are resold in another country at prices lower than the intellectual property
72. Intellectual Property: Latin American Drug Industries Condemn U.S. Pressure For Patent Laws, 11
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 786 (May 18, 1994).
73. MARKETLErR 1994, supra note 71.
74. Intellectual Property: Latin America Drug Industries Condemn U.S. Pressure for Patent Laws, supra
note 72 at 786-7.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. MARKETLErrER 1994, supra note 71.
78. Id
79. George Y. Gonzalez, An Analysis of the Legal Implications of the Intellectual Property Provisions of
the North American Free Trade Agreement, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 305, 307 (1993).
80. Id.
81. The IFAC defines parallel importing as "the import of products containing protected works not
authorized for distribution and sale in a particular country." IFAC Report, supra note 47, at 45.
1995]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
right holder in that country is ordinarily able to sell them. The consequence of
this direct competition is that the parallel importer evades the entire authorization
process, and more importantly, bypasses the payment of royalties to the
intellectual property owner." "This arbitraging of goods among international
markets precipitates a 'cat-and-mouse' competition between the parallel importer
and the authorized trademark owner." 3 In 1986, the U.S. International Trade
Commission estimated that the worldwide losses due to infringement of
intellectual property were between $43 and $61 billion,"M with gray market
goods comprising as much as $10 billion of this cost annually.8 5
Currently the United States has no explicit parallel importing protection. 6
Trademark holders in the United States have attempted to show trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act" to protect against parallel importing.
Under the Lanham Act, a trademark holder must prove that a consumer is likely
to be confused by the use of a particular trademark. 8 A balancing test is used
to determine if a competing trademark is likely to lead to confusion. 9 But
because parallel importing involves authentic goods, some courts have dismissed
intellectual property right holders' claims. 90 Other courts allow the claims if
differences in quality, physical composition, and customer service packages lead
consumers to be confused as to whether the goods are those authorized for sale
in the country where purchased. 91
NAFTA also provides no protection from parallel importing. The resolution
of this issue by NAFTA's signatories remains to be determined. Until the issue
is directly addressed, each party must rely on the domestic law of its trading
82. Gonzalez, supra note 78, at 307.
83. Id.
84. Id. at n.23. USITC Pub. 2065 at H-3 (1988).
85. John Riley, 'Gray Market' Fight Isn't Black and White, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1.
86. Shira R. Yoshor, Competing in the Shadowy Gray: Protecting Domestic Trademark Holders from
Gray Marketeers Under the Lanham Act, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1363, 1364 (1992).
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1124, 1125 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
88. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides in part:
(a)(1) Any person who ... uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device. .. which
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising ... misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods... shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (Supp. V 1993).
89. Currently the courts weigh the following factors to determine if a competing trademark has caused
confusion:
(1) the strength of the trademark, (2) the degree of similarity between the two marks, (3) the
proximity of the products, (4) the likelihood that the senior user of the mark will bridge the gap, (5)
evidence of actual confusion, (6) the junior user's bad faith vel non in adopting the mark, (7) the
quality of the junior user's product, and, finally, (8) the sophistication of the relevant consumer
group.
Centaur Communications Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, 830 F.2d 1217, 1225 (2d. Cir. 1987) (citing Polaroid
Corp. v. Polaroid Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)).
90. Yoshor, supra note 86, at 1369.
91. Id. at 1365.
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partners to adequately protect the interests of its own intellectual property right
holders. Many prominent business groups have urged that NAFTA prohibit
parallel importation, including the U.S. Council for International Business,' the
Heritage Foundation, and the American Bar Association.93
The first Article of the Intellectual Property Chapter of NAFTA states that,
"[ejach party shall provide ... adequate and effective protection and enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights, while ensuring that measures to enforce
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade."'  There is little doubt that a parallel importing restriction is a barrier to
free trade in some form. A complete ban on parallel importing is a barrier to
trade, but is it a "barrier to legitimate trade" as the NAFTA text provides?95
There is some support for legalizing parallel imports. "The legalization of
parallel imports within the NAFTA community would not cripple the theoretical
underpinnings of intellectual property protection." The trademark owners do
profit from parallel importing. 97 They are compensated when the goods are
originally purchased by the importer.98  The manufacturer also benefits from
increased competition in distribution due to more goods being sold at a lower
price.9  Overall, parallel importing could be viewed as benefiting NAFTA
states both through "efficiency gains generated by increased competition" and by
"providing NAFTA consumers with a larger selection of goods at lower prices
than available from authorized distributors."' 100
The prohibition of parallel importation is traditionally promoted by
developed countries such as the United States and Canada and staunchly opposed
by developing countries such as Mexico and Chile. Before the three
signatories of NAFTA sit down with the representatives of Chile to discuss
Chile's accession to NAFTA, the United States should seize this opportunity to
strengthen NAFTA's intellectual property provisions and push for the prohibition
of parallel importation. As more developing Latin American countries are added
to NAFTA, it will be increasingly difficult to reach a consensus for strengthening
the intellectual property provisions of NAFIA that greatly burden the lesser
developed economies."° The United States and Canada, the countries most
likely to benefit from the restriction of parallel importing, while still comprising
a majority, should strengthen NAFTA's intellectual property protection.
92. The U.S. Council for International Business represents 280 U.S. companies.
93. Gonzalez, supra note 79, at 309.
94. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1701.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Gonzalez, supra note 79, at 329.
97. Michael B. Weicher, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.: A Black Decision for the Grey Market, 38 AM.
U. L. REV. 463, 476 (1989).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Gonzalez, supra note 79, at 330.
101. Id. at 310.
102. Id. at 310. "Developed states point to their sophisticated intellectual property systems as providing
the proper incentive structure for innovations to stimulate economic growth. By contrast, developing states
perceive a well-developed intellectual property regime as disproportionately benefitting foreign investors while
administrative costs consume strained domestic resources." Id.
19951
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 2:367
C. Cultural Industries Exclusion
The Cultural Industries exclusion is not contained in NAFTA's Intellectual
Property Chapter, but rather in the chapter entitled Exceptions. 0 3  This
exception allows Canada, contrary to the general goals of NAFFA, X to ignore
all of the NAFTA intellectual property obligations (except those deriving from
Canada's adherence to other international agreements) which are detrimental to
its "cultural industries."' 5  These industries include print, film and video,
music, radio, and television."°  "Such a broad based exclusion can be used to
effectively nullify most of the benefits granted by NAFTA's intellectual property
provisions."'0 7  This arrangement is "basically economic and protectionist in
nature, antithetical to any notion of free or fair trade, and hardly a justification
for departing from otherwise acceptable intellectual property standards."'"
While Canada may apply this exclusion to any NAFTA signatory," its
effect is essentially only felt by the United States. The United States has
amended the Special 301 provision of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, to help
prevent abuses of this exclusion by Canada."0 The amendments require the
Trade Representative to identify all new Canadian acts, policies, and practices
that affect cultural industries."' In addition, the Statement of Administrative
Action, which accompanied the NAFMA implementation legislation, states that
"the Administration is committed to using all appropriate tools at its disposal to
discourage Canada and other countries from taking measures that discriminate
103. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2106, Annex 2106.
104. Charles S. Levy & Stuart M. Weiser, The NAFTA: A Watershed for Protection of Intellectual
Property, 27 INT'L LAW 671 (1993).
105. This exclusion also applies to financial services in Chapter 14 and investments in Chapter 11.
NAFTA, supra note 1.
106. Id., art. 2107.
107. Levy & Weiser, supra note 103 at 12.
108. IFAC Report, supra note 47, at 50.
109. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 2106 & Annex 2106.
I10. Subsection (a) of 19 U.S.C. § 2242 states that the United States Trade Representative shall identify:
"those foreign countries that deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, or deny fair
and equitable market access to United States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection, and those
foreign countries... that are determined by the Trade Representative to be priority foreign countries."
Subsection (e) .provides for the publication in the Federal Register of the names of those countries that
the Trade Representative has determined to have provided inadequate intellectual property protection.
Subsection (f) has been added to keep Canada's "cultural industries" exclusion in check. The new section,
entitled "Special rules for actions affecting United States cultural industries," states:
(1) In general: By no later than ... 30 days after the date on which the annual trade report is
submitted to Congressional committees... the Trade Representative shall identify any act, policy,
or practice of Canada which -
(A) affects cultural industries,
(B) is adopted or expanded after December 17, 1992, and
(C) is actionable under article 2106 of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
19 U.S.C. § 2242 (a)(e)(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
111. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(0 (Supp. V 1993).
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against, or restrict market access for, U.S. film, broadcasting, recording, and
publishing industries."'
2
No matter which country becomes the first new member to NAFTA, no
exclusions can be permitted. Free trade is not established when special deals
exist between the parties. If Chile does accede to NAFTA, and this exclusion
is permitted to remain, a precedent will be set for all future NAFTA signatories.
Under Annex 2106, this exclusion applies to all NAFTA signatories. This
arrangement is totally contradictory to the entire concept of a "free trade"
agreement. U.S. negotiators should strive to have this provision stricken before
the accession talks begin. The United States should be looking to perfect the
current NAFTA text, before the accession precedent is set. Future agreements
or accessions should only expand intellectual property protection, not create
exceptions.
III. CONCLUSION
Chile has made great strides over the last several years, reforming its
government, its economy, and its trade policies. They should be rewarded with
NAFTA accession, but only if they are willing to comply fully with NAFTA's
requirements. Their decision to offer pharmaceutical patent protection reinforced
their commitment to enter into a free trade agreement with the United States, but
their efforts were incomplete. Chile must now be willing to take the final step;
offer the full patent protection afforded by NAFMA. This includes a twenty year
pharmaceutical patent and pipeline protection. In negotiating with Chile, it is
vital that the NAFMA countries not make concessions or create more exclusions,
as all Latin American countries hopeful of joining NAFTA will look to this
accession as the model for NAFTA membership. The success of NAFTA will
be measured by the quality of the new countries admitted, not the quantity. A
country must not be permitted to join until its domestic laws are of the same
caliber as the existing members. Any deviations are a threat to the integrity of
NAFTA.
As for the present NAFTA agreement, improvements should be sought in
the intellectual property section. Although the agreement has only been in effect
for just over a year, it is not too early to identify future problems. The potential
hazards associated with parallel importing and the cultural industries exclusion
were obvious even when the agreement was is its draft form. Instead of tackling
these politically charged issues, the NAFTA negotiators chose to side-step these
sensitive matters, at the price of getting the agreement off the ground. But now
as the NAFTA countries look to an additional member, it is vital that these tough
issues be addressed. In order to reach the fundamental goal of NAFMA, a
hemispheric free trade zone, the trading rules of all NAFMA countries must be
uniform. This means no variances and no exceptions. As more Latin American
countries join the union, it will become increasingly more difficult to change any
112. The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Statement of Administrative Action,
in President's Message to Congress Transmitting the North American Free Trade Agreement, Implementing
Bill, Statement of Administrative Action and required Supporting Statements, H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 221 (1994).
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NAFTA provision. If the three NAFTA countries miss this opportunity to
correct NAFTA's obvious flaws, it may prove that NAFTA does not have the
flexibility to adapt to the trade demands of the future.
Kevin M. Jordan
